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CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY, BURDENS OF
LEGITIMIZATION: THE PRINTING PRESS AND THE
INTERNET
ZACK KERTCHER1 AND AINAT N. MARGALIT
ABSTRACT
The Internet is often regarded as a challenge to the nation-state's ability to
regulate flows of finance, information, and symbols. Rather than examining
whether it is possible to enforce regulation on such a media, this paper
addresses two additional fundamental questions: (1) what do regulatory
discourses and attempts to regulate reveal about the nation-state's political
authority under globalization, and (2) how does this authority vary across
social, political, and cultural contexts? In order to address these challenging
queries we follow a unique path, both empirically and theoretically.
Theoretically, we argue that political authority is a pivotal common
denominator that undergirds diverse understandings of globalization. We then
critically examine different conceptions of political authority and construct a
typology that orients our study. Empirically, we follow our typology by
comparing two historical phenomena: attempts by the Catholic Church to
regulate the printing press during the 15th and 16th centuries, and attempts by
China, Malaysia and the United States to regulate the Internet. Despite
certain important commonalities, we posit that each of these cases illustrates a
different model of the legitimization processes and transformations in political
authority that occur under globalization.
' Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be addressed to Zack Kertcher,
Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th St., Chicago, Illinois 60637.
Send email to: kertcherwuchicago.edu.
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CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY
I. INTRODUCTION: THE INTERNET AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY
The globalization debate crosses disciplinary boundaries and
transcends academic circles. Participants in this debate typically share a
mutual interest in the scope of globalization, its effects, and the expected
outcomes. But different disciplines emphasize their specific perspective in this
debate. Economists, for example, would most likely highlight questions of
economy and finance, while anthropologists are more likely to view
globalization from the standpoint of culture and identity. Consequently, the
terminologies employed in the study of globalization often differ.
Furthermore, the definition of globalization, and its interpretation by students
of globalization, varies. The differences can be considerable.
2
Despite greatly divergent conceptions of the studied phenomenon,
some underlying common denominators can be found. Central to these are
questions related to a nation-state's sovereignty, and more specifically, its
capacity to regulate social, economic, and political activity within its defined
territory. The relevance of sovereignty in this debate is evident considering
that sovereignty is perceived as a chief marker of the modern territorial nation-
state and the system of nation-states.3 Therefore, an analysis of this debate
would also include examination of the different views and their validity in
relation to the sovereignty yardstick.
The most widely accepted view of sovereignty generally perceives it as
a given condition of the post-Westphalian political arrangements, constituting
territorial states that enjoy an exclusive authority inwardly and outwardly.
4
This categorization, however, is problematic for analytical study because there
are no determining criteria, and thus it is not clear how exclusiveness is
measured. Another reason that sovereignty serves as a poor heuristic device
for the study of globalization is because sovereignty is not a "prime" unit of
analysis. Alternatively, political authority5 is a more elementary term that
underlies definitions of sovereignty. For example, the most acceptable
definition of sovereignty is that there is a "final and absolute authority in the
political community . . . and that no final and absolute authority exists
elsewhere."
6
Other definitions of sovereignty also subsume authority. For example,
some international relations scholars conceptualize sovereignty as "[the]
highest form of recognized and legitimate authority over a community or a
claim to rule." 7 Furthermore, political authority or the legitimacy8 of political
authority also underlies the conceptual definition of the state: Max Weber's
famous definition of the modern state calls it "the legitimate monopoly over
2 Cf JAN AART SCHOLTE, GLOBALIZATION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 13-47 (2000).
3 JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY 30 (1995).
4 Eric K. Leonard, Seeking Sovereignty: Gaining Understanding Through Critical Analysis, 23
NEW POL. Sci. 407-28 (2001).
5 For the purposes of this article, political authority is defined as the capacity to reign over a
polity.
6 Leonard, supra note 4, at 411 (emphasis added) (quoting F. H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26
(1986).
7 Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
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the use of violence within a recognized and bounded territory." 9 It is also a
more historically contingent term used to analyze political systems prior to
modern political arrangements, 10 and thus it opens up possibilities for
historical comparisons that extend beyond the modern state system. Therefore,
rather than analysing globalization through sovereignty, in this article we will
assess the different views in the globalization debate through the prism of
political authority.
Three major approaches to globalization that address political authority
can be identified. If we were to stretch a line between two poles, we would
find at one end those who say that the alleged challenges to the nation-state's
political authority, associated with globalization, are insignificant- and that in
fact, historically, the nation-state system has successfully dealt with even
stronger instantiations. 11 These challenges can be considered as normal
deviations from the modern nation-state's political authority. In other words,
globalization is not new and not significant insofar as the state's authority is
concerned. 12
At the other pole are those who claim that political authority is
challenged by globalization in ways that constitute a drastic shift from the
Westphalian system. The argument is that the nation-state loses much of its
authority due to processes such as the expansion of the marketplace and the
intensification of technological change to the point of no return. These
scholars conclude that such processes herald the end of the nation state.
1 3
Some students associated with this perspective consider the overlapping
political authority of the European medieval world before the 16th century as
the epitome of the changes in current political authority. This view
conceptualizes a shift from the modern, Westphalian, state-centered political
authority to an increasing leak of authority on all fronts to supra-state, sub-
state, and non-state actors, and specifically to the global civil society.'
4
An additional school of thought posits that there is a significant shift in
political authority, but avoids the causal link between changes in political
authority and the future of the nation-state. These scholars view globalization
as a process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political authority
from the distinct, fixed territorial boundaries - typical to the nation-state
system - to transnational and sub-national spaces. Saskia Sassen, for example,
argues that the "new geography of power" is deterritorializing and
denationalizing specific portions of the modern state's political authority,
namely the historic authority to regulate economic activity within national
9 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 904-05 (1978) (emphasis added).
l' Cf, Hannah Arendt, What is Authority?, in AUTHORITY 81, 81-112 (Carl J. Friedrich ed.,
1958).
" See generally, PAUL HIRST & THOMPSON GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN
QUESTION (1996).
12 Cf Stephen D. Krasner, Globalization and Sovereignty, in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (David A. Smith et al. eds., 1999).
13 Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 50-67 (1997).
14 Cf Ronnie Lipschutz, Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil
Society, 21 MILLENNIUM 389 (1992). Global civil society is comprised of non-government
organizations (NGOs) and other groups creating transnational links in promoting mutual
political goals such as the environment, human rights, and indigenous peoples' rights.
2005-2006
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CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY
boundaries.' 5 Along the same lines, Arjun Appadurai demonstrates the
deterritorialization of the "iron cage" typical of the modern national state that
confines authority within a fixed territory.16 This cage is gradually opening up
due to migration and "translocal spaces" - tourist zones, free trade zones, and
refugee camps. Similarly, James Mittelman diagnoses a shift of states'
political authority in globalization, or a "historical transformation ...in
politics, a loss in the degree of control, exercised locally - for some, however
little to begin with - such that the locus of power gradually shifts in varying
proportions above and below the territorial state."
' 17
The digital space, and primarily the Internet, is key to the debate on
sovereignty and globalization. The Internet is unique in its capability to
instantaneously transmit information across the globe. Information thus sent
disregards the national territorial borders by which a modern state is identified.
The Internet, which was originally developed by the United States
Department of Defense during the Cold War to address the possibility of a
nuclear attack, is a decentralized network without a central command. These
characteristics make the Internet a very good illustration of globalization as
defined by globalization theorists, namely the compression of time and space
with a global reach.1 8
Scholars from the "nothing new" camp posit that this medium is not different from
previous information technologies, such as the television, the radio, or even the submarine
telegraph cable installed in the 1860s. According to such views, these technologies did not
undermine the state's political authority, and therefore the Internet does not have a significant
effect over the state's authority.19 A useful example is the public attitude in the late 19th
century towards the radio, believing that it would serve as a powerful tool for furthering
democratization and decentralization of communication. 20 Therefore, it is possible to argue
that due to the novelty of the Internet - a technology that is still developing - the medium
could be regulated and confined to territorial boundaries in a manner similar to its
technological predecessors.
Conversely, there are those who advocate that there is an apparent
change in the state's authority, and regard the Internet both as a tool and as
evidence of this transformation. 2 1 Those in this camp argue that the Internet is
not comparable to other information technologies because it combines global
scope with very low barriers of entry, while older information technologies
(the telegraph, radio, and television) were, by and large, confined within the
nation-state's borders and control, and thus subject to physical national
regulatory regimes.
15 Saskia Sassen, Digital Networks and the State: Some Governance Questions, THEORY,
CULTURE & Soc'Y, Aug. 2000, at 19-34. The new geography of power, according to Sassen,
is the dispersal of economic activity, the ascent of a new legal regime for governing cross-
border economic transactions, and the growing number of economic activities in the digital
space. See id.
16 Arjun Appadurai, Sovereignty Without Territoriality: Notes for a Postnational Geography,
in THE GEOGRAPHY OF IDENTITY (Patricia Yaeger ed., 1996).
17 JAMES H. MITTELMAN, THE GLOBALIZATION SYNDROME: TRANSFORMATION AND
RESISTANCE 6 (2000).
18 See generally, DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POST MODERNISM (1989).
19 Giovanni Arrighi, Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the "Endless" Accumulation of
Capital, in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 53-73 (David A. Smith et al.
eds., 1999).
20 Eszter Hargittai, Radio's Lessons for the Internet, 43 COMM. OF THE ACM 50, 51 (2000).
21 See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 15.
KERTCHER AND MARGALIT
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According to this view, in cyberspace it is no longer possible to
account for the "where" question with a satisfactory answer. Legal authority,
which is confined to territorial borders and physical space, is based on the
"where". 22 Jurisdiction presumes that all interactions take place in some
territory, or physical space, regulated by a certain authority. Cyberspace blurs
these notions of "here" and "there", since it is not "physical, geometric or
geographic".23 Once Internet users type in their personal access code they
enter the domain of cyberspace. The users are still located in the physical
world, and hence under the authority of a certain government, but as they enter
cyberspace they cast off citizenship, and are not confined to the nation-states'
authority. They can enjoy the faceless anonymity of cyberspace to put on new
identities and peel off old ones. 24 The fact that cyberspace is present beyond
national borders creates legal ambiguities that are derived from conflicting
jurisdictions. This conflict of jurisdiction also poses a threat to government
authority. 25
These characteristics of the Internet also facilitate the global
connectivity of civil society activists. In Jessica Mathews' words, the Internet
is "the most powerful engine of change in the relative decline of states and the
rise of non-state actors". 26 This type of communication also aids in shaping
new global scale identities, transcending national identities, and leading to a
decline of the state's authority. 27 Furthermore, much of this electronic space is
used as a platform for global finance and capital accumulation. These discreet
portions of the Internet space escape the national regulator and thus challenge
its authority.
28
As we have seen, the main unit of reference in this debate is the state,
and the basic question is whether globalization challenges the state's political
authority. This question is then tested with the different representations
associated with globalization. In this paper we bring the same inquiry to the
case of the Internet. We examine government reactions to the Internet to test
22 G.I. Zekos, Internet or Electronic Technology: A Threat to State Sovereignty, 3 J. INFO. L.
& TECH. 1-2 (1999), at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1999 3/zekos/.
23 Stephen J. Kobrin, Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World
Economy 5-6 (1999), http://www-
management. wharton. upenn.edu/kobrin/Research/hartrev2.pdf.
24 See, e.g., SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET
(1995).
2' David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The Rise ofLaw on the Global Network, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 3-47
(Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997). Two of the best-known illustrations of this
perspective are the French and the German lawsuits against the U.S. accusing online giants
Yahoo! and Amazon of selling Nazi memorabilia on their websites. These sales made the
purchasing of such items possible for local residents, contradicting local laws. At first, the
online companies lost and Amazon removed such items from its websites. Yahoo! continued
to battle in the U.S., arguing that the French government does not have authority over U.S.'
based operations, and eventually won. See Shelly Souza, Outside the Box: A Fundamentalist
Internet?, OPTIONETICS.COM, June 22, 2001,
http://www.optionetics.com/articles/archive/article-archivefull.asp?idNo-4090; Nora
Macaluso, Yahoo! Rejects French Authority in Nazi Dispute,
E-COMMERCE TIMES. Dec. 22, 2000, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/6262.html.
26 Mathews, supra note 13, at 51.
27 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE POWER OF IDENTITY: THE INFORMATION AGE, ECONOMY, SOCIETY
AND CULTURE (1997).
28 Sassen, supra note 15.
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the validity and the explanatory capacity of the different views in the
globalization debate. We address this broader issue by examining a more
specific question, which is why governments choose to regulate the Internet
the way they do.
However, because much of the criticism of "nothing new" scholarship
is directed at the lack of historicity in the other camp's analysis, and because
the Internet is indeed an incipient technology that risks making far-reaching
conclusions about states' authority premature and potentially exaggerated, a
historical comparison might be useful.
Therefore, we will compare the reaction of governments - or to use a
more historically contingent term, the central authorities 29 _ to what is seen by
many as the Information Revolution's historic predecessor, the Print
Revolution. More specifically, comparison can be made between reactions to
the printing press and the current responses of central authorities to the
Internet.
30
There is another reason to conduct a historical comparison reaching
back to the 15th and 16th centuries, rather than comparing the Internet to a
more contemporary example. We would like to consider the validity of the
claims that view the Internet as an illustration of the return to the vague and
ambiguous political authority of the medieval political order. The printing
press, or the print revolution of the 15th and 16th centuries, was arguably a
major agent in bringing change to the legitimacy of the central authorities'
political authority, and consequently in contributing to the transformation of
the political system - from the feudal system to the modern state. 31 Therefore,
if the claims about the current transformation are correct and the comparison
to the medieval political order is valid, then we should expect to find
significant similarities that would support this proposition.
Nonetheless, as with every historical comparison involving such
remote periods, this comparison might suffer from the fact that society,
technology, and, more importantly, political authority, have changed to the
point of nullifying such an assessment. For example, the printing press
provided one of the only sources of written information available for the
literate, non-ecclesiastic public (a dramatically small group compared to
today's literacy rates), while the Internet is just one of the various information
sources - visual, verbal, or printed - available to the public. Such a
comparison, however, is viable in our more limited scope, which does not
concentrate on the effects of these technologies, but rather on the reactions of
the central authorities to the potential challenges to their political authority.
We argue that in order to understand political authority, and
transformations in political authority, it is important to understand the
processes of the legitimation utilized by central authorities to retain their
political authority. We further posit that Max Weber's theory of legitimacy or
29 Central authority is defined here as an array of political institutions that have the authority
to govern a certain polity.
30 Many have compared the Internet with the printing press. These studies, however, have paid
little or no attention to the central authority's reaction to these technological developments.
31 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, An Unacknowledged Revolution Revisited, 107 AM. HIST. REv. 87,
87-105 (1979). In the past few years the debate over the role of the printing press has
reopened after several decades during which the historical paradigm, which perceived the
printing press as a major cause for the decline of the Catholic Church, ruled. See, id.; Adrian
Johns, How to Acknowledge a Revolution, 107 AM. HiST. REv. 106, 106-125 (2002).
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authority relations, which is the dominant approach for this field of study, is
not useful in accounting for these changes. Consequently, this paper suggests
an alternative conceptual framework for the study of legitimating political
authority that can explain these transformations within a more historically
contingent perspective that might also contribute to the globalization debate.
In the main case that we examine, we have concluded that during the
Protestant Reformation the Catholic Church sensed that it was losing its
authority and reacted in various ways to retain its legitimacy and to control
challenges to its authority. This is illustrated by the Church's regulatory
practices towards the printing press. The examined cases of the Internet
illustrate similar transformations (insofar as challenges to the authority of
central authorities and their struggle to retain it). We demonstrate that this
reaction has led to a shift in central authorities' legitimation practices, which
consequently has caused tension between the central authorities' sources of
authority. We also show that due to the different legitimation practices
employed by the modern nation-state, such tension would not necessarily
result in a similar undermining of political authority as witnessed during the
Protestant Reformation.
The first part of this paper reviews conceptions of legitimating
authority, especially through Weber's approach. In this section we criticize the
Weberian typology for authority relations and offer alternative categories and
an overall alternative framework. The second part examines central
authorities' reaction to the printing press in the first two centuries after its
invention with a special focus on the Catholic Church, which suffered from a
drastic shift in its authority at that time. The last section examines central
authorities' regulatory practices vis-d-vis the Internet by examining three cases
- China, Malaysia, and the U.S. Each illustrates a certain type of central-
authority reaction to this technology, and they are models for the different
legitimation processes and transformations in political authority occurring
today under globalization.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING POLITICAL AUTHORITY
There is wide agreement among scholars that no political authority can
rule solely relying on coercion. 32 Such an authority will be unstable, and there
are no historical examples to support such an option.33 Rule must be based on
legitimacy, which, as Hannah Arendt argues, can be found even in the most
coercive regimes. 34 When coercion or violence is used, it needs to be
legitimized legally or ideologically. For example, the violence Mao applied
32 Hannah Arendt argues even further, stating that "authority precludes the use of external
means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed. Authority, on the other
hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a
process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance." Arendt,
supra note 10, at 82.
33 See generally, e.g., id. at 81-112; Herbert C. Kelman, Reflections on Social and
Psychological Processes ofLegitimation and Delegitimation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
LEGITIMACY (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds. 2001).
34 Arendt, supra note 10, at 83.
2005-2006
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against his subjects in the Cultural Revolution would not have been possible
without a prior process of legitimizing these actions. When a person is sent to
jail in a democracy for taking a bribe, it is legitimate for the government to use
coercion against him because such a move is legitimized. In order to rule,
every central authority has to rely on a strong basis of legitimacy.35 Therefore,
to understand political authority and transformations in political authority it is
necessary to examine the central authority's legitimacy and the ways in which
the central authority achieves that legitimacy and maintains its authority.
Max Weber, probably the best-known scholar of legitimacy, supports
the above proposition. 6 Weber perceives legitimacy as a necessary condition
for a systemic order and for order maintenance. 37 There are three ideal types
that Weber proposes for authority relations. These are (a) traditional, the belief
in the sanctity of ancient traditions and customs; (b) charismatic authority,
which is the conviction in a certain person that holds certain extraordinary
leadership qualities; and (c) legal-rational, the virtue of the belief in the
validity of existing rules and political institutions.
38
Weber's analysis of authority and legitimacy is important and
creative. 39 However, as we demonstrate in the next section, Weber's theory
does not account for transformations of political authority, nor is it historically
contingent, and the categories Weber utilizes are ambiguous and problematic.
Alternatively, we suggest a different analytical categorization for authority
relations: performance-based legitimacy, constructed legitimacy, and legal-
formal legitimacy. Before explaining these categories, we wish to clarify our
critique of Weber' s theory.
First, it is not sufficient - contrary to Weber's argument - for a person
to hold extraordinary leadership qualities in order to become a charismatic
leader. The charismatic leader also has to appeal to certain emotions (as
opposed to rationality) that exist a priori in certain social groups, and by so
doing, gains legitimacy. For example, today many far-right leaders in Europe
appeal to traditional and moral emotions and avoid using rationalistic
rhetoric. 41 These leaders focus on idealism and provide their listeners with a
sense of "spirituality" that is not acceptable to the traditional politicians of the
35 We accept that different social groups and different individuals respond differently to
legitimation efforts and to variant political and economic conditions in accordance to their
identities. See, e.g., PRASENJIT DUARA, RESCUING HISTORY FROM THE NATION: QUESTIONING
NARRATIVES OF MODERN CHINA 7-10 (1995); David Easton, The Perception ofAuthorily and
Political Change, in AUTHORITY (Carl J. Friedrich ed. 1958). However, in this paper we
attempt to assess the central authority's reaction to a perceived threat to its legitimacy and
authority; such research does not necessitate reference to different social groups and their
specific attitudes towards political authority.
36 WEBER, supra note 9, at 31-32.
37 Weber complicates the understanding of such order by arguing that there are different
interpretations for the meaning of such systems of order, not only in different social groups,
but also in the same social group and even within the same person. Id.
381d. at 215-16.
39Hanah Arendt, for example, also understands that authority depends on various sources of
legitimacy such as ancient customs or laws of nature, but, as other scholars, she does not view
charisma as an element to ensure legitimacy. In that sense Weber is distinguished from other
scholars. Arendt, supra note 10, at 83.
40 Kelman, supra note 33, at 59.
41 Weber himself supports this conceptualization, saying "charismatic authority is sharply
opposed to rational." WEBER, supra note 9, at 244.
KERTCHER AND MARGALIT
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left or right. Thus the charismatic leader appeals to preexisting emotions, or
traditional beliefs, which are associated with a separate Weberian category -
traditional authority.
Another characteristic of charismatic political leaders is that they
usually successfully emerge under specific socio-economic or political
conditions, especially poor conditions. We can assume that under certain
conditions the success of these leaders should be much higher than in
prosperous times. For example, it is possible to assume that Hitler would not
have been so successful in mobilizing Germany if there had been no economic
depression at that time. Therefore, this category is useful in accounting for the
success of charismatic leaders in only very specific situations. Overall, the
category of the charismatic source of authority is limited to explaining very
specific circumstances and appears to be somewhat redundant to alternative
Weberian categories.
Secondly, the chronological differentiation Weber makes between
traditional authority and legal-rational authority is, to a great extent,
historically myopic and somewhat unclear. The traditional category in
Weber's typology refers to "immemorial" or ancient traditions, 42 and generally
Weber associates this type of authority with all systems of government
predating the modem state. 43 However, it is not clear why, for example, we
cannot fit into such a category more "modern" forms of political authority that
exist in the modern nation-state, such as those exercised under Communism or
under parliamentary liberal-democracies. Tradition does not need to be
"ancient" so long as the individual is socialized to accept the political
authority as some sort of historical truth. A person who grew up in a 50-year-
old democratic country is more likely to accept this type of regime as
traditional because he or she was socialized by such agents as the media and
the education system.
Moreover, the difference between a rational basis for authority as a
one-to-one relationship with legal authority and Weber's traditional category
is not apparent. Weber defines the rational basis for authority as "resting on a
belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to
authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority), 44 and he
connects this type to modern systems of governance. Nonetheless, the
meaning of rational insofar as political authority is not sufficiently clear.
Weber clearly does not follow the utilitarian tradition of rationality. 45 The
keyword here is "belief." This word restricts Weber's own understanding of
rationality to a subjective, and therefore not universal, interpretation.
However, Weber does not clarify how this belief is achieved. Is it natural, pre-
given, or constructed?
Michael Foucault dwells on this point in his work focusing on the
ways in which this belief is constructed.46 He finds that modern central
42
Id. at 215.
43 See Peter M. Blau, Critical Remarks on Weber's Theory ofAuthority, 57 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 305, 307 (1963).
44 WEBER, supra note 9, at 215 (emphasis added).
45See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988)
(providing a review and a critique of this interpretation of rationality).
46 Michael Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell et al. eds. 1991). Foucault uses a periodization similar
to Weber's. He distinguishes between modem systems of governance and pre-modem the
2005-2006
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authorities force rationality on their subjects. Foucault argues that the modem
state legitimizes its rule by exercising its disciplinary authority through a
variety of techniques, such as surveillance, policing, institutions (i.e. schools
and factories), and procedures or laws. He calls this system of modern
legitimation of authority "governmentality." Therefore, although Weber was
correct that modern political arrangements stress more bureaucratic-rational
dimensions and employ more seemingly rational methods than in previous
political arrangements, rationality's principal function is to legitimize and to
enable rule.
On a more general historical understanding, which is not restricted to
modern times, social order must be based on conscious rather than rational
agreement. This agreement is achieved through rituals that shape cognition
and form symbols to which we react, depending on our socialization process.
When these symbols are violated or the rituals undermined, coercion increases
and authority weakens.47 In this perspective, rationality should be understood
as another tool to establish conscious agreement. Laws serve the same
purpose. Laws are also means for justification, legitimizing and maintaining
this specific agreement. This is the reason why most laws vary so much
relative to historical and political context. In other words, the hyphenation of
legal-rational is not self-evident.
This interpretation of rationality, however, also applies to Weber's
category of traditional authority. Rituals and symbols are not limited to
modern times. And if a person believes in a "traditional" basis for authority it
does not mean that he is irrational, no more than someone that trusts the
validity of a certain legal system and believes the rationality of a political
system is doing so from a natural and absolute rational basis free of social
influences.
Lastly, Weber's categories cannot account for changes and
transformations. Laws change in accordance with certain pressures, both
internal and external. Internal demands, which result from certain shifts in
legitimacy and authority, and the following exchanges and negotiations
between rulers and ruled, put pressure on the central authority to alter laws to
accommodate these transformations. Accordingly, external pressures can also
be applied to one political authority as it interacts with other political
authorities. Examples of such pressures are wars, economic pacts, and
environmental treaties. They each apply external pressure on a political
authority to adapt its laws to a certain international situation and influence
other sources of authority as well.
Weber does not stress this aspect of maintaining authority and order. In
fact, as Peter Blau suggests, Weber takes the existence of legitimate authority
for granted and thus neglects to systematically conceptualize a theory of the
conditions that created transformations. 48 This aspect of authority is crucial
not only in modem states but also in ancient states. For example in ancient
China, if the ruler was unsuccessful in providing for the basic needs of his
watershed being the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries with the Reformation and the Counter-
Reformation and the departure from feudalism towards the modern state, which finally
emerged in the eighteenth century.
47 Randall Collins Randall, Stratification, Emotional Energy, and the Transient Emotions, in
RESEARCH AGENDAS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS (Theodore D. Kemper ed. 1990).
48 See, Blau, supra note 43.
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subjects, his authority was questioned, challenged, and even rebelled against.
49
Similarly, when French peasants were starving in the 18th century, they
rebelled and transformed the entire political system. Therefore, we have added
another category to the analyzes of authority relations, that of legitimating
authority by performance, or performance-based legitimacy. It appears that
this type of legitimation is very significant for modern political authorities,
probably even more so than in previous times. Today, most political
authorities might lose their authority prior to the point of starvation. The
reason for this change, that is, the emphasis on provision (economic and
security), derives from the changing role of the state, especially since the
French Revolution.
A. PERFORMANCE-BASED LEGITIMACY AND THE CHANGING ROLE
OF THE STATE
While accepting the arguments of Michael Mann 50 and Prasenjit
Duara5 1 that the history of the state is not linear, it appears that states' role
regarding their populations has changed, especially in the past 100 years. As
Gianfranco Poggi says "It is a safe generalization, applying to all Western
states, to say that over [the 19th century] as a whole, the scope of state action
increased.,52 This process, which was initiated in the French Revolution when
most European states started to apply direct rule over their subjects, 53 also
promoted the provisions that the state guaranteed its citizens. In other words,
since the French Revolution, the modern nation-state emphasizes performance.
Under this political order, rulers bargain with their citizens for collective
citizen's rights guaranteed by the state in exchange for duties. In return for
regularly paying taxes and participation in wars, the provisions of security,
education, and welfare are assured.
54
A major milestone of this historic trend is the establishment of the
modern welfare state at the end of the 19th century. Bismarck increased the
Prussian state's legitimacy by guaranteeing to citizens rights such as national
health benefits, accident insurance, old-age and disability insurance, and
housing. 55
Some systems of governance put more emphasis on this type of
legitimation, with liberal democracies being the most significant. In liberal
democracies much of the stability of the political system is achieved by actual
4 9 DINGXIN ZHAO, THE POWER OF TIANANMEN: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND 1989 BEIJING
STUDENT MOVEMENT 21, 40 (2001).
5 0 MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER: A HISTORY OF POWER FROM THE
BEGINNING TO A.D. 1760 37-39 (1986).
51 DUARA, supra note 35, at ch. 1.
52 GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE STATE, ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 67 (1990).
53 CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, A.D. 990-1992 25, 103, 107-
14 (1992).
54 Id. at 110, 115.
55 MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER: A HISTORY OF POWER FROM THE
Beginning to A.D. 1760 674-75 (1993). According to Mann, Bismarck provided these benefits
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performance.56 However, performance-based legitimacy is not reserved for
this type of regime. For example, as Samuel Huntington demonstrates, one of
the primary challenges to political authority, one that led to a breakdown of
legitimacy in modern authoritarian regimes, was an inability to cope with
military defeat or poor economic performance.
5 7
B. CONSTRUCTED LEGITIMACY AND UNIFYING MYTHS
The second category we suggest is constructed legitimacy. Following
our critique of Weber, traditional authority is not restricted to a certain
historical period, but is based on morality, which, because it is achieved
through socialization, is constructed. The term "constructed" also implies the
embedded dynamism of the process that makes subjects believe in the
rightness of this authority. Crucial components of maintaining constructed
legitimacy are "unifying myths." Unifying myths are not a modern invention;
they are as old as political authority itself. They anchor parts of a certain
individual's identity vis-Ai-vis a certain cosmic reality,5 8 they order history, and
they establish a collective past and tradition (viz. national, religious or
parochial identity).5 9 Unifying myths must be maintained. Their preservation
is carried out through influence of the various channels of communication,
such as the education system and the media60 or, in previous times, religious
ceremonies and mythology. As John Schaar argues, "Over time, if the rulers
manipulate symbols skillfully, symbolic rewards alone may suffice to maintain
supportive attitudes." 61 If the unifying myths are not maintained, they erode
and legitimacy declines.
62
An example of this in modern political arrangements is nationalism,
the national unifying myths that are essential to ensuring and maintaining
constructed legitimacy. In Anthony Smith's words, "Nationalism . . . is
primarily a cultural doctrine or, more accurately, a political ideology with a
cultural doctrine at its center. It seeks to attain and preserve 'the autonomy,
unity, and identity of a nation'.'
63
Change or transformation primarily occurs when the unifying myths of
one system break down, vis-d-vis alternative unifying myths that validate a
different political authority. Such alternative unifying myths - or in Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann terms, "symbolic universes" - "pose a threat
because [their] very existence demonstrates empirically that one's own
56 Seymour M. Lipset, Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy, in LEGITIMACY AND THE
STATE 88-92 (William Connolly ed., 1984).
57 See generally, SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).
5' A person has multiple identities; some might even conflict with each other in certain
conditions. Cf, DUARA, supra note 35, at 7.
59 
PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A
TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 103 (1967).
60 Kelman, supra note 33, at 58.
61 JOHN H. SCHAAR, LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE 21 (1981).
62 BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 59, at 105.
63 ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 74 (1991), quoted in Erica Benner, Is There a
Core National Doctrine?, 7 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 155, 158 (2001).
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universe is less than inevitable." 64 Nazism, for example, which introduced its
own set of unifying myths that challenged previously accepted ones, led to the
collapse of the legitimate authority of Weimar Germany.
65
One way of examining these transformations is by viewing the social
and economic conditions that facilitate such a shift. 66 A circumstance such as
an economic crisis, a famine, or a war might lead to a challenge to the
legitimating order as a result of discomfort caused by a dissonance or tension
between the projected unifying myths and economic/political reality.
67
Another example is the Cold War, during which both sides demarcated
boundaries of "us versus them" and "good versus evil." Liberal democracies
stressed the "darkness" and the "backwardness" of communism, while
communist regimes mocked the "corrupting" capitalist system. During this
period the focus was on constructing these unifying myths on both sides by
controlling the media and writing history books that reflected these myths. As
the communist ideology became increasingly less credible due to a poor
economic reality combined with ideologically disillusioned party leaders, the
unifying myths were not maintained and eventually the Soviet Union
collapsed.68
C. LEGAL-FORMAL LEGITIMACY
The third and last type of legitimacy we utilize is the legal-formal
category. Legal-formal includes the laws and rules that appear to be formal.
The word "appear" is emphasized because formality is also an acquired
process, achieved by the socialization process. Laws written in a certain book
do not make them legitimate. Certain socialization processes that make the
subjects believe in the formal validity of these laws legitimates them. The
legitimation of this source of authority provides the central authority with the
legitimacy to use coercion and violence. The legal-formal category supports
both performance-based legitimacy and constructed legitimacy. For example,
if a U.S. federal law obligates every naturalized immigrant to swear his or her
allegiance to the U.S., then this is one instance of a legal-formal way to
legitimate constructed legitimacy. If there is a law that allows a government to
cut or increase taxes as it wishes, it supports the performance-based
legitimacy. At the same time, constructed and performance-based legitimacy
support each other, as well as the legal-formal. These three types are
64 BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 59, at 108.
6' Arendt, supra note 10, at 83.
66 Easton, supra note 35, at 171-74.
67 Christian S. Crandall & Ryan K. Beasley, A Perceptual Theory ofLegitimacy:Politics,
Prejudice, Social Institutions, and Moral Values, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY 78-79
(John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001). Of course, personal identity shapes the ways in
which the unifying myths are perceived (gender, religion, socioeconomic status, ethnicity
etc.). See Easton, supra note 35, at 189. Also, different social groups might be affected
differently by certain conditions. Thus, they will legitimate or deligitimate if affected
differently by these conditions.
68 Leszek Kolakowski, Mind and Body: Ideology and Economy in the Collapse of
Communism, in CONSTRUCTING CAPITALISM: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND
LIBERAL ECONOMY IN THE POST-COMMUNIST WORLD (Kazimierz Z. Poznanski ed., 1992).
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facilitated by central authorities in different conditions and influence each
other.
These three ingredients of legitimacy are apparent in every regime, but
the legitimating recipe varies. Some regimes, and especially more
authoritarian ones, might emphasize constructed over legal-formal legitimacy
or performance-based legitimacy (i.e. Mao's China or the Taliban), while
others explicitly stress performance-based legitimacy (i.e. post-Mao China -
see Zhao 2001).
We now examine the conceptual framework that accounts for
transformations in the political authority, and the reaction of central authorities
to the printing press.
II. THE PRINTING PRESS
The political system in Europe during the Middle Ages differed from
the modern manifestation of the national territorial state. Although monarchs
ruled over certain territories, political authority remained vague and
ambiguous. It was shared by the king and his lords, who in turn shared
authority with the church. This political arrangement is known as the feudal
order.
69
Despite the vagueness of political authority, under the feudal order all
territorial units were seen as some sort of an ideal, united, political
arrangement of Respublica Christiana, or the Christian State. The highest
authority in this state, as the name implies, was bestowed on (or, more
accurately, taken by) the Catholic Church. As Samuel Finer says, "The church
was not only a state, it was the state: it was not only a society, it was the
society." 70 The empire was ruled by "two swords:" the temporal sword of the
king, or feudalism; and the spiritual sword of the Pope, or the church, which
enjoyed uncontested constructed legitimacy. Although the church was a
crucial element of the feudal order it was not exactly a part of it. Some church
officials served under monarchs, but at the same time the church exercised a
wholly independent jurisdiction over a wide area of civil matters.71 In this
system the king did not enjoy full political authority, but the church did. This
is not surprising when we consider the legitimation process by which the
church validated its authority, which was basically achieved by the church's
"penetration into all the relations of life. 72
One of the central legitimating devices was education. Prior to the
invention of the printing press, central authorities, especially the Catholic
Church, were not too concerned about books undermining their authority,
although the church did ban books that were considered heretical. This
practice began as early as 150 A.D. with the condemnation of an
unauthenticated history of the life of St. Paul.73 Another major instance of
69 1 SAMUEL FINER, THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES 867-68, 874
(1997).70 [d. at 857.
71 Id. at 888; POGGI, supra note 52, at 38.
72 FINER, supra note 69, at 857.
73 GEORGE H. PUTNAM, THE CENSORSHIP OF THE CHURCH OF ROME: ITS INFLUENCE
UPON THE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF LITERATURE at, v. 1 (1906).
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censorship by the Catholic Church was Constantine's decree from 325 A.D.
censoring Jewish books. 74 These books were few in number with limited
circulation, and did not pose a serious threat to the church's nearly absolute
constructed legitimacy. 75 It had almost complete control over the spread of
knowledge and ideas at that time, as it monopolized the production of books.
Monks manually duplicated books, so that the number of titles and their
subjects remained relatively limited, since copying a book was a slow process.
Likewise, because libraries were inside monasteries, very few non-
ecclesiastics had access to books. Even if they gained access, it is very
doubtful that they would have been able to read them, since literacy rates were
near zero. Furthermore, the church was the absolute educational authority, for
the simple fact that only few outside the church were educated.76 In short, the
church regulated public opinion, the unifying myths it presented were
perceived as "Godly truths," and its constructed legitimacy was rarely
questioned.
A. THE INVENTION OF THE PRINTING PRESS
The production of books spread like wildfire in Western Europe
following the invention of the printing press in 1450. 77 It is estimated that
during the Incubala78 alone, approximately 15,000 different texts were printed
in 20 million copies,79 and in the 16th century 150,000-200,000 different
books and book editions were printed, totaling more than 200 million copies.
As Benedict Anderson argues, business entrepreneurs realized the benefits of
the new medium and contributed a great deal to the rapid spread of the book.80
This increase in the supply of books eventually led to a drop in their prices, so
more people than the most affluent could purchase books. 81 The growing
demand was not just for religious publications but also for secular literature in
vernacular languages. 82 The numbers of libraries and the number of volumes
within these libraries grew as well. Both libraries and books became accessible
to a wider segment of the population. The proliferation of book-distributed
knowledge was not restricted to Catholic religious materials as before, but also
74 WILLIAM A. M. POPPER, THE CENSORSHIP OF HEBREW BOOKS 2 (1968).
75 PAUL F. GRENDLER, THE ROMAN INQUISITION AND THE VENETIAN PRESS: 1540-1605, at 63-
5 (1977).
76 PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 10.
77 Johann Gutenberg invented the first printing press in 1450 in the city of Mainz, Germany,
and he printed the first book in 1454. MIRIAM ELIAV-FELDON, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION 29
(2000)
78 Incubala is the period of time from Guttenberg's invention to 1500.
79 LUCIEN FEBVRE & MARTIN HENRI-JEAN, THE COMING OF THE BOOK: THE IMPACT OF
PRINTING 1450-1800, at 248 (1976).
80 See generally, BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (1994). For example, from
an average of about 400 to 1,500 copies per book in 1480, books averaged 2,000 copies by
1491. FEBVRE & MARTIN, supra note 79, at 218. In 1527, Erasmus's Colloquies, probably one
of the earliest bestsellers, not including the Bible, sold 24,000 copies. Id.
81 FEBVRE & MARTIN, supra note 79, at 218, 249.
82 Id. at 249-50, 255. Latin lost its primacy as an international language by the seventeenth
century. Id. at 274.
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included classical literature, new ideas in science, political philosophy, and
most importantly information about religious reformations.
83
Within a relatively short period of time the Catholic Church lost its
hegemony over public opinion and the traditional socio-political structure
began to transform. While the spread of books was not the only cause for the
demise of the church,8 4 the printing press did erode its authority by assisting
the spread of new ideas and competing myths. These new myths contested the
church's unifying myths and weakened its constructed legitimacy.
In order to appreciate the contribution of the printing press to the
political transformation, 85 it might be useful to have a "before and after"
evaluation regarding the printing press. We therefore turn to a comparison
between John Huss and his follower Luther. In 1415, the Council of Constance
condemned and then burned the writings of Huss, who had criticized and
demanded to change some of the core principles of the Catholic Church. The
Church burned Huss at the stake a year later.
8 6
Martin Luther made accusations and claims about the church similar to
those made by Huss, but Luther wrote after the printing press was invented.
His pamphlets and sermons translated from Latin to vernacular languages
were instantly reprinted and sold in the thousands. It took exactly seven days
for the first edition of his famous pamphlet To the Christian Nobility of the
German Nation to be sold out, and within two years twelve more editions had
been printed.87 Overall, Luther's writings represented "more than one third of
the total number of German books sold between 1518 and 1525".88 Luther's
ideas proliferated and reached a large audience of readers, and soon after
many Christians, following his doctrine, departed from the Catholic Church. 89
B. CENTRAL AUTHORITIES' POLICIES TOWARDS THE PRINTING
PRESS
It took the Catholic Church 75 years to orchestrate its censorship
policies to accommodate the new technological and political realities. At first,
the printing press was perceived as a useful tool for the church to promulgate
its doctrine, and limited steps were taken to address the transformations.
83 ROBERT A. HOUSTON, LITERACY IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: CULTURE AND EDUCATION
1500-1800, at 166 (1988).
84 The transformation in the Catholic Church's authority started before the Fifteenth Century
and gained salience especially following the Sixteenth Century. The printing press was not the
only cause for the decline in the authority of the Catholic Church. Others include the Black
Plague, the Hundred Years' War, and perhaps the facilitation of war because of the use of
gunpowder that was introduced to Europe. Therefore, we do not argue a one-to-one causality
between the printing press and the loss of authority of the Church. We do argue, however, that
the spread of books and printed materials eroded the Catholic Church's constructed basis of
authority and especially its unifying myths.
85 In the past few years the debate over the role of the printing press has reopened after several
decades during which the historical paradigm, which perceived the printing press as a major
cause for the decline of the Catholic Church, ruled. See AM. HIST. REv. (2002) (providing a
good review of the different opinions on this matter).
86 PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 70.
87 HOUSTON, supra note 83, at 167.
88 FEBVRE & MARTIN, supra note 79, at 291.
89 Id. at 295.
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However, as the church began to perceive the potential and practical threat to
its unifying myths and view its undermining of constructed legitimacy, church
authorities gradually escalated their intervention and censorship. The initial
regulatory measures were not adequate to contain the spread and influence of
printed books.
In 1479, Pope Sixtus IV authorized the University of Cologne to use
ecclesiastical censures against printers, purchasers, and readers of heretical
books. The focus was directed at suppressing heretical writing.90 In 1487,
Pope Innocent III published a bull that decreed excommunication, fines, and
book burning as punishments for those dealing with heretical books. In 1501,
Pope Alexander VI issued an additional bull, authorizing universal censorship
with the desired goal of homogenizing censorship throughout Christendom.
By that time the Roman Church was "shaken to its foundations by the
Protestant Reformation, and alarmed at the increasing power which the secular
state arrogated to itself."91 This decree was written in the traditional form of
guidelines, which were general, vague, and inefficient at preventing the
circulation of books disapproved by the church.
92
In 1515, as the Catholic Church witnessed the rapid dissemination of
heretical books and Protestant ideas that threatened to undermine its authority,
reached the conclusion that more drastic measures should be taken to contain
the danger. At the time it was already clear that "[it was] the church whose
authority and existence had been assailed and the contest was fought out over
creeds and not political platform." 93 In that year, Pope Leo X issued a bull
forbidding the printing of any book without the church's authorization. 94 The
Roman Inquisition was established in 1542, and in 1543 it was ordered that no
book, regardless of its contents, should be published or sold without the
permission of the Inquisition. The first detailed list of banned books was
printed in Venice and comprised 70 titles. Larger lists were issued in Florence
(1552) and Milan (1554), and from 1559 the Index Librorum Prohibitum -the
index of banned titles- was published by the church and updated
periodically.
95
In the Catholic states of Western Europe, censorship was in the hands
of the church. However, despite strict regulation, little or no enforcement was
taking place. 96 Only after the 1550s did Catholic states such as Venice and
Spain assume exclusive control over the printing press with the guidance of
the church's index. 97 In most cases, however, printing press regulation was not
consistent. Books prohibited in one index did not appear in another published
elsewhere, and extra-territorial enforcement was uncommon.98 Even in Italy,
the geographic area where the Roman Church probably enjoyed the highest
levels of legitimacy, authorities were not able to fully manage the circulation
90 GRENDLER, supra note 75, at 71; HENRY S. STEINBERG, FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF PRINTING
186 (1959).
91 STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 186-87.
92 GRENDLER, supra note 75, at 71.
93 PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 9.
94 FEBVRE & MARTIN, supra note 79, at 244.
95 Id.
96 GRENDLER, supra note 75, at 74-86.
97 HOUSTON, supra note 83, at 163, 165.
98 PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 4.
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and production of books. 99 For example, Luther's writings were smuggled into
and sold to the highly regulated city-state of Venice soon after they were
published.100 All over Italy, and even in Rome itself, it was not too difficult to
acquire a condemned book.0 1
Censorship in France is another case in point. Although the country
was under the auspices of the Catholic Church, it was more influenced by the
French (Gallic) Church, and papal indexes were not accepted as binding unless
the Gallic Church approved them. The Gallic Church, however, wanting to
demonstrate its authority, usually did not accept the papal indexes, and instead
created its own. 10 2 This resulted in relatively loose regulation and
enforcement, which can also be tied to the French kings' interest in increasing
print production for economic purposes more than protecting the doctrines of
the Catholic Church. 10 3 The outcome of these regulatory practices was that
French booksellers, in many cases, sold banned books to meet the great
demand for them. The risk was very low, as long as they adopted some simple
techniques to circumvent censorship. These included omitting the publisher's
location from the title, using false imprints, 10 4 assuming pseudonyms,
falsifying places of publication, 10 5 and inventing small volumes or "pocket
books" intended to escape the censor's eye. From a broader perspective, this
demonstrates the socio-political reconstruction of political authority in Europe
at that time.
In polities where the church had already lost its political authority (e.g.,
Protestant territories), printing press regulation was rather different. Most
Protestant territories (England, Holland, and North Germany) also regulated
the printing press, but unlike the Catholic states were not under a single central
religious authority. Thus censorship was a tool in the hands of monarchs, who
used it to shape and control public opinion for their own purposes and to
increase their constructed legitimacy.1
0 6
In England, even before the split from the Church of Rome under
Henry VIII, the Roman Church never gained control over printing press
regulation. The crown regulated the press by using non-ecclesiastical censors,
who followed its unifying myths. 107 In 1529, Henry VIII became the first
monarch to publish a list of banned books, and royal permits were required in
order to establish a printing press. In 1538, when English authorities realized
that many forbidden books were being imported, they forbade imported
English books. In 1543, the English Parliament legislated the "Act of the
advancement of true religion" in order to prevent "non-reliable" people (e.g.,
women, artisans, and laborers) from reading books and reaching their own
judgments. However, enforcement was not very strict, and readers could buy,
for instance, pornographic literature imported from France.
0 8
99 Id.
100 GRENDLER, supra note 75, at 72.
101 PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 37-38.
102Id. at 31.
103 Id. at 27, 40.
104 FEBVRE & MARTIN, supra note 79, at 307-08, 311.
105 STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 189.
106 PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 48.
107 Id. at 41-42; STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 186.
108 HOUSTON, supra note 83, at 165; PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 42.
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In the Protestant city-states of northern Germany, every polity adopted
its own print regulations, which were prepared by both Protestant ecclesiastics
and by civil authorities under the absolute authority of the State. As in
England, various political, economic, and religious interests shaped the
regulation. In general, the penalties were much less severe than those in Spain
or Rome, and the enforcement less strict. Due to the fragmented geopolitical
structure of this region, books prohibited in Berlin, for example, were printed
in Leipzig, and if a specific title was also condemned in that city, then it was
produced in Leyden or Amsterdam, 10 9 since the Dutch regulation was probably the
least restricted in Europe.110 In fact, Dutch printers used the various techniques mentioned
above to escape foreign censors in efforts to capture a share of the foreign book market.111 The
local regulation aimed solely at the Dutch press banned criticism of Dutch authorities.112 In
many cases the indexes and restrictions only drew public attention to banned books. For
example, it is said that in sixteenth century Holland the index was used as a recommended
book list.'13 Consequently, the demand for the banned titles increased and so did their
prices. 114
In Muslim territories outside Christian Europe, the printing press was completely
banned due to the belief that Arabic letters, the letters of the Koran, were sacred and that only
qualified people could recreate them. As early as 1485, the Ottoman Sultan, Byazid II, issued
an order forbidding the printing of Arabic letters by machines. This order was reissued by his
successors. The centralized structure of the Ottoman Empire made certain that the decision
was strictly and efficiently enforced. Only in 1728 was the first printing press established in
Istanbul, but religious objections led to its closure in 1742. The first Koran was printed in
Istanbul in 1875.115
The printing press contributed significantly to transformations in the political power
of central authorities at this time. The Internet, the modem historical parallel to the printing
press, is much faster and has broader territorial coverage. It thus poses not only similar
dilemmas for today's central authorities, but new ones as well.
IV. INTERNET REGULATION
No country is required to connect to the Internet, but almost every
government chooses to. 116 By connecting to the Internet a government adheres
109 PUTNAM, supra note 73, at 48-52.
110 HOUSTON, supra note 83, at 165.
ill STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 190. Thus it is possible that John Hobbes's Leviathan may
have been issued in Amsterdam, and not in London as the imprint indicates; the same is true
for nearly all French Enlightenment literature. Id.
112 HOUSTON, supra note 83, at 163.
113 Id. at 166.
114 STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 191.
115 Manfredo Macioti, Innovation and Diffusion of Technology: an Example of the
Printing Press, 154 IMPACT OF SCI. ON SOC'Y 143, 146 (1989). The Koran was printed prior to
that in Europe, and in European colonies. Id. at 146.
116 There are no indications of international coercion from any source for connection to the
Internet. As of 1999, Iraq, Libya, and Myanmar were completely disconnected from the
Internet. Human Rights Watch, The Internet in the Mideast and North Africa: Free Expression
and Censorship Online, (1999) http://www.hrw.org/hrw/advocacy/internet/mena/ (last visited
Jun. 3, 2003); Internet Remains Prohibited in Myanmar, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 3, 2000,
available at http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f-VS&art id-905355752. Today, Iraq,
Myanmar and Syria, though connected to the Internet, limit access only to governmental use.
As Internet Grows, Censorship Follows, NUA.COM, April 28, 2000, at
http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f-VS&art id-905355747. Afghanistan, under Taliban
rule, was connected to the Internet but in July 2001 the government decided to disconnect.
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to specific rules, norms, and standards (communications protocol, networking
standards, etc.) In other words, they join a specific regime. One of the most
important reasons for countries - especially developing ones - to connect to
the Internet is because these countries' governments see information
technology generally, and the Internet specifically, as a "magical" stepping-
stone to the twenty-first century, global, economic reality. Countries believe
that by connecting to the Internet they connect their citizens to the
"Information Revolution", and as such might enhance their human capital and
improve their economic position. In this respect, the Internet is seen as a fast
train headed in one direction - towards economic growth. Since this train is
always accelerating, these countries fear that if they do not jump on they will
never be able to catch up. The other reason is that if they do not do so, other
neighboring countries will; thus they might lose their competitive advantage
or even go backwards in terms of relative development.
For example, in the Asian region, Singapore is competing with
Malaysia and China to become the regional hub for the Internet and the
Information Revolution. For this purpose, Singapore officials argue that they
have to improve their technological connectivity, Internet user rates,
infrastructure, and knowledge as quickly as possible. Minister of Information
and Arts, George Yeo, has been very explicit about Singapore's goal:
Geography will matter less in the future. We must therefore
think of new ways to retain our position as a hub... if we will
succeed, we will be one of a number of great cities among the
Pacific Century. If we fail, other hubs will displace us and we
will be relegated to a backwater."l
7
A. CHINA
China has taken the spirit of Yeo's statement seriously. The country
joined the Information Revolution lateI18 but with great determination.
During the 1990s the Chinese oligarchy realized that "China must vigorously
promote the development of information technology". 119 Information
technologies, and especially the Internet, are crucial elements for China's
economic development. However, China began with a low starting point. The
lingua franca of the Internet is English, and China possessed a poor
telecommunication infrastructure, resulting in high telecommunication prices.
Its cumbersome administration was not suitable to address the nimbleness of
new technologies.
Taliban Outlaws Net in Aghanistan, REUTERS, July 17, 2001, available at
http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f-VS&art id-905356983. It can be assumed that with
the displacement of the Taliban, Afghanistan led to the reconnection to the Internet.
117 Garry Rodan, The Internet and Political Control in Singapore, 113 POL. SCl Q. 63-89
(1998).
1is The first Internet transaction in China was in 1986 when an email message was sent out
using the Chinese Academic Network (CANET). However, the Internet was not public in
China until 1995. China's Internet Development Timeline, CHINAONLINE.COM, Dec. 29, 2004.
119 Dali L. Yang, The Great Net of China, available at
http:/home.uchicago.edu/-dalivang new page Ihtm (2001).
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Chinese officials recognized that bureaucratic complexity might inhibit
technological innovations and Internet development. Consequently, the new
Ministry of Information Industry was introduced in 1998. The government
devoted US$28 billion to pave more than 100,000 kilometers of fiber optic
cable linking many parts the country. 120 To further encourage Internet growth,
the Chinese government started a project aimed at putting all government and
its affiliated agencies online. By 1999, most government departments had
some sort of online presence. 12 1 There has also been impressive growth in
Chinese Internet users. In 1996, a year after the Internet was publicly
introduced in China, the number of users was less than 100,000; two years
later, in 1998 there were 1.2 million users, and this number has doubled every
year since. 122 Today, following the U.S., China has the second largest number
of home Internet users in the world, about 56 million.1
23
However, the Internet poses a threat to the Chinese oligarchy's
unifying myths and authority that conflict with the government's pro-Internet
programs. As in other countries, the Internet is not used, by and large, for
carrying political content, 124 and China has been gradually reforming media
censorship since the 1980s. 12 5 Chinese government officials perceive the
Internet as a political risk to its authority. This was the primary reason for
China's late promulgation of the Internet. As the official party paper The
People's Daily put it, the Internet is a "battlefront to infiltrate China."
126
Therefore, until adequate technologies might contain this battlefront, the
government banned unfettered public Internet usage. China's Minister of Post
and Telecommunications at the time stated, "China as a sovereign state is
putting this type of information under control."' 127 Bill Gates' statement that
the Chinese government is trying to "have their cake and eat it too"
128
captured the tension between the desire to promulgate the Internet and at the
same time control much of its content. In other words, the tension between
performance-based legitimacy and constructed legitimacy is easily recognized.
China's government devotes immense resources to the censorship of
Chinese Internet usage. 129 The Ministry of Information Industry, the same
administration that was established to promote the Internet in China, also
maintains constant surveillance over online activity.1 30 For example, the
government blocks websites that include 'Western decadent culture" content
(i.e. porn sites), and sites with undesired political and "counter-revolutionary"
content. 131 Blocked sites include those of Taiwanese and Tibetan dissidents
120 Georgette Wang, Regulating Network Communication in Asia: a Different Balancing Act?,
23 TELECOMM. POL'Y 277, 284 (1999).
121 Yang, supra note 119.
122 LESLIE D. SIMON, NETPOLICY.COM: PUBLIC AGENDA FOR A DIGITAL WORLD 49 (2001).
123 China Number Two in Home Net Usage, REUTERS, April 22, 2002.
124 Yang, supra note 119.
125 (Zhao 2001: 325)
126 Yang, supra note 119.
127 Wang, supra note 120, at 283.
1281d. at 285.
129 Yang, supra note 119.
130 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, China Loses Grip on Internet, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk! /hi/world/asia-pacific/2027120.stm.
131 Yang, supra note 119.
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and American newspapers. 132 Censorship is not limited to websites; it is also
active in chat-rooms and Usenet groups, where the government allows access
for only computer- and science-related Usenet groups. 133 On some occasions
the government has taken the drastic measure of intentionally stalling Internet
traffic to hamper trans-border-dissident online information exchange.1
34
Other than managing censorship with technological means, Chinese
authorities also require self-censorship of ISPs, which are mostly government
owned. Strict enforcement is applied when these regulations are breached.
Websites are shutdown, many webmasters and Internet users are put on trial,
and some are even jailed. 135 For example, government officials closed as many
as 17,000 cyber cafes, which were operating without suitable filtering
software. 136
Despite keen regulatory and enforcement efforts the Internet still poses
a "genuine challenge to the ruling elite," or, more accurately, a challenge to
the ruling elite's unifying myths, as the government admits it cannot fully
control Internet usage. 137 As the Internet expands, it is more difficult to
enforce censorship, especially when that censorship occasionally changes. In
some instances, the Chinese have even relaxed censorship. For example, when
the Internet was introduced in China, all users had to register with the police.
This requirement was subsequently waived. 138 These conditions have enabled
civil groups, such as the Falun Gong, to make extensive use of the Internet to
mobilize their members. Even non-dissidents utilize the Internet to criticize
the government on issues such as corruption, 139 human rights and
democracy. 140
In the race between Internet development and its censorship it appears
that Internet development prevails. Lin Quan, secretary-general of China's
State Science and Technology Commission, announced that official
censorship would not be allowed to stop the growth of Internet use. 14 1 Some
conclude from this that "the Internet is changing China profoundly, breaking
down the stranglehold on information held by China's communist rulers".
1 42
These views are most likely exaggerated. It would be more probable that the
Internet reflects, and also contributes to, long-term transformations that occur
in the Chinese regime.
One notable effect of the Internet is to pressure the Chinese
government towards more liberalization of other media. An example is the
Chinese state-run television station that reported a catastrophic mine incident
in which 81 miners were killed. The government did not want the news to
spread, but hours after the incident the information had disseminated over the
132 Wang, supra note 120, at 280; Peng Hwa Ang, How Countries Are Regulating Internet
Content, at
http:/iwwwis c.org/isociwhatisiconferences/ineti97iproceedingsiB lBi 3.1HTM,0sI2 (1997).
133 Peng Hwa Ang & Chee Meng Loh, Internet Development in Asia, at
http:/iwwwisoc.org/isociwhatisiconferences/ineti96iproceedings i hli L.htm (1997).
134 Yang, supra note 119.
131 Wingfield-Hayes, supra note 130.
136 Bobson Wong, China closes 17, 000 Internet cafes, DIGITAL FREEDOM NETWORK, (2001).
137 Yang, supra note 119.
138 Ang, supra note 132.
139 Yang, supra note 119.
140 Wingfield-Hayes, supra note 130.
141 Wang, supra note 120, at 283.
142 Wingfield- Hayes, supra note 130.
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Internet. Since the story had already gotten out and been largely circulated, the
authorities allowed for coverage on the more regulated forms of media.
143
Stories like this illustrate how the Internet contributes to more governmental
transparency and the liberalization of traditional media. 144 Furthermore, a
different kind of pressure is coming from above. China was forced to change
its policies as a condition to its acceptance to the World Trade Organization.
Now China allows foreigners to own 49 percent of Internet companies that
operate in China; by agreement, after two years this number will increase to 50
percent. 145
Malaysia, one of China's regional economical competitors, chose a
different path than China; it turned almost completely to legitimation by
economic performance.
B. MALAYSIA
Malaysia provides a case illustrating a major reliance on legitimizing
government's authority by economic performance. Since 1970, a few years
after the establishment of the country and its independence from colonial
forces, the Malaysian government declared its goals of "building a progressive
society which shall be oriented to modern science and technology."' 146 And
indeed, during 1970, Malaysia started to industrialize and to move towards
becoming an export-orientated economy. The primary export products,
however, remained primarily natural resources.
When Mahathir Mohamed was elected Prime Minister in 1981 he
sought to materialize his predecessors' aspirations with fervor. Following his
nationalist ideology, his 1969 book The Malay Dilemma called for Malaysia to
break out of the marginalization of the colonial era through economic
development. Mahathir was determined to transform Malaysia into an Asian
tiger, a leading producer and exporter of cars, steel, and high-technology
goods. Malaysia continued its industrialization at an increased pace.
Symbolizing this process, substantial construction began and massive office
buildings and hotels appeared, including the Petronas Towers, the world's
tallest building. 1
47
In 1996 the Malaysian government published "The Way Forward -
Vision 2020" ("Vision 2020"), declaring a very ambitious goal: to increase
eightfold the country's economy by reaching an annual GDP growth rate of
seven percent in the year 2020, thus completing the "hightechisation" of the
country in that time. 14 This target was to be achieved specifically by
developing human capital and by sponsoring sophisticated
143 Id.
144 Yang, supra note 119.
145 Shanthi Kalathil, China's Dot-Communism, 122 FOREIGN POL'Y 74 (2001).
146 Tim Bunnell, Multimedia Utopia? A Geographical Critique of High-Tech Development in
Malaysia's Multimedia Super Corridor, 34 ANTIPODE 266-95.
147 JERRY EVERARD, VIRTUAL STATES: THE INTERNET AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE NATION-
STATE 59-63 (2000).
148 Bunnell, supra note 148, at 267.
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telecommunications infrastructure. 149 As in China and Singapore, Malaysia's
government aspired to surpass its neighboring countries in terms of
"hightechisation" and economic performance. 5 ' In 1997 Mahathir, still acting
as Prime Minister, tried to motivate Malaysians to achieve these goals as soon
as possible, warning: "If we wait, we will be backward and will not
understand the spread of knowledge and technology, past, present and future.
Our race will be a primitive race, to be fooled, humiliated and oppressed by
others."1
5 1
It appears that the ultimate goal of Vision 2020 was to gain legitimacy
through economic performance. Uniquely, it was also an attempt to increase
constructed legitimacy by doing so. As Mahathir himself declared, the
program's goal was to institute "a united Malaysian nation with the sense of
common and shared destiny", or a "national unity which goes beyond the
singular defense of narrow ethnic interests". 152 With this unifying myth
constructed by the Malaysian government, Malaysia was to become unified
into a single information society. Such a model was chosen because of the
Prime Minister's recognition that in the 20th Century nation-states should be
"less as sovereign bastions than as nodes in a network of information
flows". 153
The jewel in the crown of this vision is the establishment of the
Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) that models Malaysia's efforts, and is
intended to push the country into the 21st century. 154 The MSC is a 50 by 15
kilometer zone, extending from the capital Kuala Lumpur to the international
airport at Sepang in the south. The MSC was planned to be a regional high-
tech hub both for local activities and for foreign investors. This high-tech
space, aimed to duplicate the Silicon Valley, including high-tech cities and
Cyberjaya, or an "intelligent city," where the foreign and local high-tech
companies were intended to operate from, and in which a multimedia
university was established (with the intention that local graduate students will
find their way to foreign companies and, by doing so, will increase indigenous
expertise). Putrajaya is the electronic city of the Federal Government
Administrative centre, a chief user of MSC outputs, and a center for
digitalizing all government activities.
155
The inhabitants of this "space" are over-privileged compared to the rest
of the country. New laws were enacted specifically for this zone to provide
intellectual property rights protection for innovations developed within the
MSC, unrestricted employment of knowledge workers (both foreign and
local), relaxation of migration and profit repatriation rules, a unique set of tax
breaks, and further economic incentives, in addition to freedom of
communication regulation.156 It is clear that Mahathir also planned the MSC to
achieve primacy over Singapore and China as the regional high-tech hub.
149 Robert W. Blanning et al., National Information Infrastructure in Pacific Asia, 21
DECISION SUPP. SYS. 215, 221 (1997).
150 Bunnell, supra note 148, at 265.
151 Id at 263.
152 Tim Bunnell, (Re)positioning Malaysia: High-Tech Networks and the Multicultural
Rescripting of National Identity, 21 POL. GEOGRAPHY 105, 113.
153 Id at 106.
154 Blanning, supra note 149, at 221.
155 Everard, supra note 147, at 59-61.
156 Bunnell, supra note 148, at 267. SIMON, supra note 122, at 317.
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Convenient labor and tax regulations, and the MSC innovation, were
not enough for the Malaysian government. It realized that it had to offer
something that both China and Singapore would not be able to match, and by
so doing achieve a competitive advantage in the race to attract foreign high-
tech firms. So the Malaysian government declared that the MSC is to be fully
exempt from Internet censorship. Excluding the MSC, the rest of the country
remained subject to the prior Internet censorship regime, which was on similar
levels and concept to China and Singapore. While publicly expressing concern
at the availability of pornography and dissident voices on the Internet,
Mahathir announced that the MSC is to be exempt from such censorship.
The Internet-haven model could not manifest itself in terms of two-tier
Internet censorship. When the MSC was built it was realized that it would be
almost impossible to have discriminatory Internet regulation. There were two
available options, to either raise the barrier for the MSC, or lower it for the
rest of the country. The latter was chosen, 5 7 and in 1999 the Prime Minister
announced that there would be no Internet censorship in Malaysia. Unlike
Mahathir's statement, however, it appears that there is still tension between
the unifying myths of the Malaysian information society and maintaining these
myths given the unregulated flow of information.
Malaysia has not changed its official regulation policies, but it has
declared that Muslims who post Internet content insulting to Islam will be
prosecuted. Access to pornographic materials is still highly debatable, but the
government cannot tolerate sacrilegious content.I58 This echoes previous
grievances made by Mahathir about the fact that too much of the information
on the Internet is Western and mainly from the U.S., compared to insufficient
Asian information. As a result, he called Association of Southeast Asian
Nations members to have a more assertive presence on the Web.
The U.S. has a longer tradition of emphasizing performance-based
legitimacy than Malaysia. This tradition, however, does not mean that the
American government is overlooking other categories of legitimizing
authority.
C. THE UNITED STATES
At first, it seemed that the U.S., Internet pioneer and the most active
Internet user,159 had chosen a laissez-faire approach to the Internet. In 1997,
President Bill Clinton's administration published a framework document for
the government's regulatory approach to the Internet. The administration
declared that it did not intend "to interfere with the essentially free nature of
the Internet."' 160 This approach presumed that the private sector would lead
157 SIMON, supra note 122, at 317.
158 Malaysian Gov. Assures Net freedom-for Some, ZDNET,
http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f-VS&art id-905356246 (Dec. 12, 2000).
159 The U.S. is the leading country insofar as absolute number of Internet users. With 164.14
million Internet users, which account for more than 30 percent of Internet users, and 58.5
percent of the U.S. population, the U.S. is indeed the leading Internet actor. How Many
Online, NUA.COM, at http://www.nua.com/surveys/how many online/n america.html.
160 Kobrin, supra note 23, at 1.
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Internet development and that the government could simply step aside and
collect the economic harvest, and, more importantly, the political return.
61
Government usually favors the invisible hand only when they direct it
and when it works to increase their performance-based legitimacy. For
instance, in balancing economic and national security, the U.S. has decided to
a great extent to deregulate its export laws on encryption. The advantage
would be e-commerce proliferation, which, overall, is supposed to increase
economic growth. The downside is that as encryption becomes more
widespread, it is easier to use encrypted messages for criminal and terrorist
purposes that might be directed against the U.S.1 62 Therefore, the economic
aspect of the performance-based legitimacy trumps the security aspect of
performance-based legitimacy.
However, when the security aspect of the performance-based
legitimacy was actually challenged, the central authorities altered their policies
and turned to tighten regulation. Following the September 1 1th attacks, the
U.S. Senate reopened the encryption export laws for discussions, targeting a
restriction of encryption export and use, as well as requiring a backdoor for
every encrypted message. These legislative acts resulted mainly because the
Senate believed that Al Qaeda had used encrypted messages to correspond
with the attackers. However, this information, which was available to the
Senate, did not facilitate legislation before the attack. 163 The U.S. also cut
Internet connections to Somalia. The government shut down Somalia's only
ISP (the Somalia Internet Company), which was suspected of having
connections with Al Qaeda.1 64 This act was in direct contradiction to U.S.
policy to globally allow the proliferation of the Internet.
Even prior to September 1 1th, U.S. legislators decided that a hands-off
approach was harmful to U.S. legal-formal legitimacy and that Internet content
should be regulated. In 1995, the Communications Decency Act was passed.
This regulation held ISPs responsible for exposing minors to Internet content
of a sexually explicit nature. 65 The U.S. Supreme Court generally objected to
these innovative Internet regulations.166 It stated: "The interest in encouraging
freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship."'
167
The other perceived threat to U.S. legal-formal legitimacy is online
gambling, which poses a threat to the current regulated gambling monopolies,
161 GREGORY F. FREVORTON & LEE MIZELL, THE FUTURE OF THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION
IN LATIN AMERICA: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 33 (2001).
162 Ren6 Marlin-Bennett, [CANN and the Global Digital Divide: Questions of
Democracy Participation (2001) (on file with author).
163 Jack Kelley, Terror groups hide behind Web encryption, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2001,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2001-02-05-binladen.htm. Other terrorist
organizations such as Hamas, and Hezbollah are believed to utilize the same communication
techniques. Id.
164 John DeSio, Somalia's Internet is casualty of war on terrorism, DIGITAL FREEDOM
NETWORK. Nov. 29, 2001. It is not clear how exactly the U.S. did this; some sources indicate
that it was done by cutting off Somalia's international communication gateway. Id.
165 Everard, supra note 147, at 136. The Online Privacy Protection Act was passed in the
Congress in 1998 and effective from April 24 2000. This act regulated Internet sites directed
toward children. SIMON, supra note 122, at 316-17.
166 Wang, supra note 120, at 279.
167 Janet Osen, In the Battle of the Bits - Final Score: Internet 1, Congress 0, NETWORK
SECURITY at 12-16, (1997).
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and is a problem due to the tax haven such online operations offer."' In 1998,
the Senate passed the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act banning
unauthorized parties from operating online gambling sites. However, as law
enforcement authorities admit, it would be impossible to enforce such
regulation due to the Internet's structure and the fact that these online
gambling sites operate overseas in countries that have legal online
gambling. 1
69
A greater challenge to both legal-formal as well as performance-based
authority is the financial marketplace, which mainly takes place in cyberspace.
Many online financial transactions escape state regulations by not breaking the
law, but by "transcending" the law. The volume of these financial activities
only grows. For example, it is estimated that online exports (e-commerce
transactions) will increase to about $1.4 trillion by 2004; this would account
for approximately 20 percent of global exports. Taxing these transactions is
almost impossible given the current territorially based taxation regimes. As a
result, real tax revenue has significantly declined in the OECD countries, and
especially in the U.S.
17 0
V. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates, from a historical perspective, Max Weber's
well-known theory of authority relations is of limited use in examinations of
transformations in political authority. The ideal types Weber utilizes are vague
and redundant, and, in general, their potential for analytic use is limited. The
static nature of Weber's theory and its neglect of the legitimization practices
of central authorities make it especially inadequate for the study of
transformations in political authority. The alternative framework for studying
political authority that we introduce in this paper correlates the reactions of
central authorities to the printing press with their contemporaries' reactions to
the Internet. We have demonstrated that analyzing political authority and the
legitimization practices of central authorities sin a more historically contingent
manner is significant in accounting for political transformations, and enables a
broader historical understanding.
In applying this framework to the study of central authorities' reaction
to the printing press, we discover the pressures that the alternative unifying
myths of Protestantism had on the constructed legitimacy of the Catholic
Church and the legitimization efforts the Catholic Church took to mitigate this
pressure. The Catholic Church sensed that the Protestant alternative eroded its
unifying myths and thus undermined its constructed legitimacy, which was the
primary basis of the Catholic Church's authority under the feudal order.
Consequently, the Church and other central authorities, such as the Ottoman
Empire, that dreaded the perils of an uncontrolled dissemination of knowledge
168 The pressure on U.S. central authorities to regulate Internet gambling is greater than
maintaining legal-formal legitimacy because the offline gambling industry donates millions of
dollars to both political parties (Bell 1999).Tom Bell, Internet Gambling: Popular,
Inexorable, and (Eventually) Legal, CATO INSTITUTE (1999), at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-336es.html.
169 Id.
170 Kobrin, supra note 23, at 9-16.
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to their constructed legitimacy, started to more strongly and strictly regulate
the printing press. This regulation, as we saw, was not equal in terms of goals
and scale in all places.
However, it was too difficult for the Church to contain the damage
already done to its unifying myths. Gradually the blanket of Respublica
Christiana, which until that time had covered most parts of Europe, was full of
holes and eventually torn to pieces. Print-capitalism, the diffusion of literacy
in a growing segment of the population, and the proliferation of alternative
myths facilitated by alternative central authorities, spurred alternative
identities and national identities. Thus, political authority increasingly shifted
171from God to the nation-state
Although the Internet operates in a different political order - as
territorial nation - states are the primary and legitimate political authority. The
framework we suggest is also applicable in clarifying the reactions of central
authorities to the Internet, and more generally to globalization. In answering
the attempt to account for government's regulatory practices vis-di-vis the
Internet, the cases reviewed in this paper demonstrate that the motivation is
primarily led by an emphasis on legitimization by performance (typical for
globalization) and a compromise between other sources of authority (legal-
formal and constructed legitimacy).
The Internet could have remained in the darkness of the laboratories of
the U.S. Department of Defense, but, with the end of the Cold War, the
Internet's original use was transformed from martial to mainly commercial.
This signifies a broader process that began prior to end of the Cold War. The
unifying myths of Communism gradually declined, symbolically crumbling
with the collapse of the Berlin Wall. This transformation increased the
pressure on governments to shift their legitimization efforts to an emphasis on
performance, not only in the U.S., but also in China, and elsewhere. Malaysia
is an extreme example of such alteration. However, governmental regulatory
reactions are not identical. They vary in accordance to the regime type, and,
more specifically to sources of authority and legitimization practices that the
government employs.
The Chinese case illustrates an authoritarian country that has shifted its
focus from constructed legitimacy towards performance-based legitimacy.
China's connection to the Internet and its encouragement of Internet use
symbolizes this transformation. However, much of the Chinese government's
legitimacy still relies on its constructed legitimacy and socialist unifying
myths. Therefore, similar to the Catholic Church more than half a millennium
ago, the spread of the unregulated word is undermining the Chinese
constructed legitimacy, and is perceived as an overall threat to the stability of
the political regime. And like the Catholic Church, Chinese authorities have
invested great efforts and resources to minimize the damage by employing
various censorship technologies. Their efforts are not fruitless but are far from
being complete, as the Internet, even in its regulated form, facilitates existing
transformations in China's political order. However, unlike most central
authorities in times of the Protestant Reformation, the Chinese government's
shift to performance-based legitimacy provides them with an alternative
171 As Prasenjit Duara notes, "few have emphasized how this same technology [the printing
press] also enables rivals of a nascent nation-state to construct alternative representations of
the nation." DUARA, supra note 35, at 9-16.
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source of legitimacy to rely on, and to some extent mitigate, the potential
damage to the government's political authority.
The constructed legitimacy of the U.S. is not greatly threatened by the
Internet, but its legal-formal legitimacy and some elements of its performance-
based legitimacy are. The Internet reveals some of the inherent tensions in
sources of authority and political structure. The U.S. relies rather
exceptionally on the legal-formal source of authority. 172 Therefore, online
gambling, pornography, and especially tax evasion challenge this source of
authority, and can be perceived as an overall threat to the government's
political authority. Legislators find it problematic to moderate these challenges
due to embedded systemic tensions in the various sources of authority. For
example, it is problematic to censor pornography due to a conflicting legal-
formal principle, which is one of the American unifying myths - freedom of
speech.
The proliferation of the Internet and Internet-related technologies (such
as computer encryption), which were actively encouraged by U.S. central
authorities to increase their legitimation by performance, have proven that
such emphasis can also damage other aspects of the same source of authority.
The inherent tension in the different aspects of performance-based legitimacy
was blatantly revealed in the September 1 1th attacks, which was orchestrated
in part by using the Internet.
Malaysia is a model for an almost complete reliance of the central authority on
performance-based legitimacy. The government is directing its efforts toward
the construction of myth of a Malaysian information society that would bring
ethnic groups closer and would bridge existing cleavages so as to produce
economic prosperity. The MSC, as a high-tech space, with different legal-
formal legitimacy than the rest of the country, is a test bed for this endeavor.
However, maintaining laboratory conditions is difficult as far as political
authority is concerned. Therefore the Malaysian government had to
compromise its legal-formal legitimacy - and consequently its current
constructed legitimacy - by deregulating the Internet in the entire country.
In conclusion, central authorities are not passive with respect to the
potential and actual challenges to their political authority, and more
specifically, governments are active participants in globalization. 173 The fact
that states support, and even encourage, globalization does not necessarily
mean that states' authority, as "nothing new" scholars claim, remains stagnant
regarding globalization processes. On the contrary, their legitimation
processes have shifted towards emphasizing performance. And, as the
deterritorialization camp argues, this transformation undermines other sources
of authority.
Nonetheless, such transformations do not inevitably foretell the demise
of the modern nation-state, as they did with the political hegemony of the
Catholic Church in Europe. Current transformations in legitimation processes
are different from the condition of the Church, which relied almost solely on
its constructed legitimacy. When this source of authority was undermined the
Church lost its rule. Under globalization, however, similar challenges to
172 See MANN, supra note 55, at 646-54.
173 See William Sites, Primitive Globalization? State and Locale in Neoliberal Global
Engagement, 18 Soc. THEORY 121, 121-44 (2000) (providing a similar argument about the
active role that states take in globalization).
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central authorities' unifying myths have a different significance because of the
shifting reliance on alternative sources of legitimacy, namely performance-
based legitimacy. These transformations should be understood as yet another
historical stage in an ongoing cyclical process that alter the state and its
legitimation practices.
Lastly, the conception that is introduced in this paper is merely an
incipient one. In order to develop and enhance this framework, more instances
of globalization and/or other historical political transformations should be
examined. The reaction of central authorities to immigration, and to economic
and financial challenges, would be interesting subjects for further study.
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